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      PEACEKEEPER #3(unpublished)

 

 

     

     

      METALLIX #9 (unpublished)

 

 

     

             

               METALLIX #1

 

      

   

     PEACEKEEPER #5 (unpublished)

 

 

               FREEMIND #2

 

 

      FREEMIND #8 (unpublished)

 

     

HEAD HONCHOS

SKIP FARRELL, 

DICK GIORDANO & BOB

 

 

 

 

DEATHMASK #5 (unpublished)

 

 

 

FREEMIND #7

 

 

 

 PEACEKEEPER #1(unpublished)

 

 

METALLIX #11 (unpublished)

 

 

 

PEACEKEEPER #4 (unpublished)

 

 

FREEMIND #11 (unpublished)

 

THE DAYS OF FUTURE PAST

 

 

An Editorial by BOB LAYTON

 

  Quite a few regulars to my website have asked me about what happened to Future Comics that prevented it from succeeding and what were the reasons for the company's closing. What follows are excerpts of a report that I composed to investors concerning the circumstances that lead to the company's failure:

 

Dear Future Comics Investors,

 

After the seismic boom in sales in the mid 90’s, the traditional or direct comics market retrenched.  Many of the publishing companies who focused on strictly heroic fantasy content (costumed super-heroes) have downsized or folded and over a third of the direct outlets have closed their doors. 

This collapse was due to several contributing factors:

The collectable value of comics has tanked. Purchase patterns are now driven by mainstream iconic characters or company brand loyalty—not by investors.

From that peak period until today, there is still a glut of inferior products being regularly produced —over 300 titles monthly.

Driven by a fatal misreading of the marketplace, publishers concentrated on superficial elements and ancillary products development instead of quality

content

CrossGen, a heavily-funded start-up publisher, recently imploded and eventually filed for Chapter 7 protection. 

To many insiders, this was not unexpected and it illustrates the point that superficial product results in failure.

The Direct Market now belongs almost exclusively to Marvel and DC. They’re well on their way to breaking the back of the Independent publishers. Add to that the fact that Marvel and DC are continuing to flood the market with over 20 new titles per quarter, simply to push the independent competition off the stands.

The point is: as much as people love the 21 page monthly comics—one simply cannot succeed by publishing them—exclusively.

Before I explain the root causes of our failure in the marketplace, allow me to briefly refresh you on our company's history:

 

 The formation of FUTURE COMICS was announced by Dick Giordano and me at a press conference on Saturday, June 9th, 2000 during the HEROES CON in Charlotte, NC.

Dick, Head Writer David Michelinie and I believed that comics should be readily accessible and written for a general audience, something that's gone by the wayside in recent years.  Everybody in the comics industry seems to be upset that there are no new readers coming in, and though they are trying gimmicks to get people into the genre, it's not really working.  I firmly adhere to the philosophy that the root cause lies in the fact that the product is being written exclusively for a niche’ audience. As a result, comics are not attractive to a mass market readership.  The creative principles in the company strongly felt that we should tailor Future Comics projects, for lack of a better term, a little more mainstream—stuff that could be read by the 'Average Joe'.

 The first Future Comics offering was FREEMIND in August of 2002. Following Freemind, Future Comics’ second, regular monthly series launched in November with METALLIX.  Altogether, the company released three action titles by August of 2003 which included our best seller—Deathmask.

 

 The Future titles met with near-unanimously glowing reviews—heralding our debut as a “return to greatness” or referring to us as “The next Marvel Comics”.

 However, good reviews do not necessarily translate into a successful operation.

 

 The Direct Market is a term used to identify the loosely-associated chain of 1100 independent book stores whose main business is the sales of comic books and related merchandise. All merchandise purchased from wholesale outlets to these stores is non-returnable.  Meaning: whatever quantities they buy at the wholesale level—those sales are considered final.

All mainstream comics sold to these comic shops are done the under the auspices of a single, monopolistic (and possibly malevolent) entity—Diamond Comic Distributors.

In many ways, Future Comics was revolutionary, but especially so in our radical business plan which used the internet to exclusively self-distribute our publications. For two years prior to our first release, Dick Giordano and I mapped out a daring, but sound, business plan that would allow an independent publisher to be profitable in a market dominated by Marvel, DC and Diamond. The only way that could be accomplished was to cut Diamond's discount of 60% off the cover price out of the mix.  Which we did--and magically, the numbers worked.

By the spring of 2003, almost half of 1100 comic retail shops in America were signed up to participate in our Future Comics Retailers’ Club.

It was at that point that Diamond, being genuinely concerned that our operation might pose a threat to them, proposed that they partner with us in the distribution of our products—promising to double our sales and bring our little start-up into the limelight with a premiere publisher status in their catalogue.

So...we bit.

 

 Unfortunately, this move proved to be disastrous for us on several levels.

 

 Foremost, the promises made by Diamond were hollow.  They rarely followed up on any request and never promoted our products as promised.  Additionally, our Retailers’ Club members abandoned us en masse’, generally feeling betrayed that we ”sold out” to the despised monopolistic distributor.

The sad truth is that abandoning our original self-distribution plan is what ultimately lead to the company's sad demise.

Before Diamond entered the picture, our self-distribution plan was working.

It was a regrettable miscalculation to accept Diamond’s offer to distribute us instead of staying the course with our original business model. However, their promise of doubling our sales and reaching profitability in our first year of operation proved to be too great of a temptation to pass up.  Prior to the deal, we felt as if we had Diamond "between a rock and a hard place" with our successful distribution operation.

I received calls from Diamond's V.P. on a weekly basis, trying to sweeten the deal or suggesting some sort of compromise to get us onboard.  Little did we suspect that it was a ploy to break the back of a little publisher that dared to defy the 'Overlords of Comic Distribution'.

 

 And then—there was Free Comic Book Day on May 3rd, 2003 .

F.C.B.D. was a bust, even though we successfully distributed over 90K copies of Metallix #1 nationwide-- totally for free, in a quality package that far exceeded our competitions’ product.

Diamond encouraged us to participate, guaranteeing that we would see a 12% increase in sales as a result. That estimation was, as it turned out, highly-speculative and proved to be entirely false. And, when it was all over, we didn’t get a single percentage point bump in our sales, after spending a whopping $16,000.00 in promotional expenses. 

 The Direct Market retail community is ruled by Diamond’s iron-fisted approach.  Many retailers voiced to us that they were fearful of reprisals by Diamond if they purchased their Future titles from us directly.  No matter how we sweetened the 'deal', the retail community remained stubbornly resistant.

Here are merely four examples of how Future Comics' distribution catered to the retail community without success:

 

1. Future Comics gave the Direct Market free shipping (not available thru Diamond) We gave them deeper wholesale discounts than Diamond. But still, the retailers still didn’t order sufficient quantities to keep us going.

 

2. We made our products 100% returnable (free for all intents and purposes) while all sales from Diamond are non-returnable.  But still, the retailers still didn’t order sufficient quantities to keep us going.

 

3. The storeowners complained that they wanted us to lower the cover price from $3.50 to $2.99— which we did.  But still, the retailers still didn’t order sufficient quantities to keep us going.

 

4. They wanted us to make our products available thru Diamond too, which we did-- but even after that, the retailers still didn’t order sufficient quantities to keep us going. In fact, orders dropped.

 

 One of the major reasons that we started Future Comics was that nearly every retailer that Dick Giordano and I talked to in the Direct Market voiced that they were tired of the callous way they were being treated by Diamond and pledged to support our efforts. It seemed to us that they were crying out for someone to attempt to change the system…and to show them some respect in the process.

 As it turned out—that was not entirely true.

 

 While there are many respectable and business-savvy retailers in the Direct Market, the majority of them are penny-ante dabblers whose whims change with the drop of the proverbial hat with little or no business sense whatsoever.

It's no longer a mystery to me as to why the Direct Market has been slowly shrinking into oblivion.

 

 And, a grim fact has to be taken into consideration in all of this: The comics industry is totally (and possibly illegally) controlled by Diamond, Marvel, DC, Wizard and Quebecor. There's a substantial amount of 'under the table' dealings occurring between these entities on a steady basis. They work closely and clandestinely to control the marketplace and unfairly squeeze out any competition.

 

 Unfortunately, it wasn’t merely miscalculations in the Direct Market that affected Future Comics adversely.

 

 A substantial amount of our debt was incurred through mismanagement by our financial department during the early phases of the company’s start-up. We were basically being robbed blind. Unfortunately, since those employees had name authorization with our financial accounts, none of the creditors were willing to allow us to file theft claims.   When combined with lackluster sales in the Direct Market, it became readily apparent that we might be heading in the wrong direction as a business entity.

Once our eyes were opened to the mismanagement crisis,  we initiated a sizable layoff of the employees in non-critical positions in January of 2003.

 Then, on Monday, February 17 of 2003, Future Comics’ office was vandalized and our computer network infected with a virus that all but shut the company down.

We discovered that thieves had broken into the complex’s externally-located electronics room, sabotaging only the equipment that allowed Future Comics to conduct its e-commerce business.  Additionally, a virus was implanted into our network, shutting us entirely down for over a week.  Although we had no idea who was responsible for this act of sabotage, we continued to pursue every avenue to uncover the perpetrators and prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law. In addition to the e-commerce side of Future Comics’ business being adversely affected, PDF files of our latest crop of books were corrupted beyond repair. Replacing the corrupted files delayed the launch of that month's books until late March. That meant almost two months without any income from sales, while vouchers and bills continued to pour in.

Undaunted by this chain of adversity, we rushed to get everything back to normal within the following 7-10 days and apologized to our retailers, urging them to continue doing business with us.

Unfortunately, we were never able to trace the sabotage back to the perpetrators, but it was more than likely the work of disgruntled former employees, given that the attack was 'insider specific'.

 Realizing that the overall Direct Market was declining in sales every month, as well, we made the difficult decision to redirect our efforts into a more profitable market.

Comics, on average, are selling at a fraction of those mid-decade numbers. When I was still freelancing, not a single editor or publisher ever asked me to take a pay cut (which I would have gladly done) in order to curb rising art & editorial costs.

I’m an artist and a writer—but I’m also a businessman. A&E is the single determining factor to the high price of comics today.  It only costs about $0.22-$0.40 per copy to print the bloody things. A & E costs are simply not aligned to the percentage of sales in the comics industry.  So, if readers want to be pissed off at the industry for the rising cost of a comic book, they should aim the anger where it belongs—at the Big Publishers and the inflated pages rates that their favorite artists receive.

  Future Comics announced in August of 2003 that we would be concentrating our efforts on creating mass market books and would cease publication of our regular monthly titles. It had become rather obvious that consumer tastes were gravitating towards the trade paperback format. While the Direct Market has continued to decline in 2003, mass market interest in the genre has been on the increase. We had prided ourselves on breaking new ground, whether it's self-distribution, returnability or, in this case, creating material exclusively for the mass market. Europe and Japan have embraced that format for decades and statistics clearly show that the U.S. is now heading in the same direction. In the last  few years, revenues from the mass market have eclipsed that of the entire Direct Market with a 30% growth projected for 2004.

That, and the skyrocketing costs of producing the 21 page monthly format, made our move a "no-brainer".

  However, I made the crucial decision to return to self-distribution and a mass market format far too late in the game to prevent the company from drowning in debt.

Desperately, I sought out new investors to finance our new, more austere business model.

However, new funding was not found in time to initiate that plan.

 

So Future Comics was forced to close its doors for good.

 

 However, there continues to be interest from Hollywood in producing feature film versions the Future Comics characters. Those talks are ongoing. In fact, I’m heading back out to there next week to meet with three major studios. 

Hopefully, our labor of love may yet live on in an entirely different venue.

Only time will tell.

 

Regretfully,

Bob Layton

President & Editor-In-Chief

FUTURE ENTERTAINMENT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 <<BACK

 

 

 

 

 

FREEMIND #10 (unpublished)

 

 

FREEMIND #9 (unpublished)

 

 

 

DEATHMASK #6 (unpublished)

 

 

 

DEATHMASK #7 (unpublished)

 

 

 

DEATHMASK #8 (unpublished)

 

 

 

METALLIX #10 (unpublished)

 

DEATHMASK #4 (unpublished)

 

METALLIX #6

 PEACEKEEPER #2(unpublished)

METALLIX #9 (unpublished)

METALLIX TRADE PAPERBACK #1 (unpublished)

 

FREEMIND #12 (unpublished)

DEATHMASK #9 (unpublished)